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Don’t Forget Your Supplier When Remanufacturing 
 
A popular assumption in the current literature on remanufacturing is that the 
whole new product is produced by an integrated manufacturer, which is 
inconsistent with most industries. In this paper, we model a decentralised closed-
loop supply chain consisting of a key component supplier and a non-integrated 
manufacturer, and demonstrate that the interaction between these players 
significantly impacts the economic and environmental implications of 
remanufacturing. In our model, the non-integrated manufacturer can purchase 
new components from the supplier to produce new products, and remanufacture 
used components to produce remanufactured products. Thus, the non-integrated 
manufacturer is not only a buyer but also a rival to the supplier. In a steady state 
period, we analyse the performances of an integrated manufacturer and the 
decentralised supply chain. We find that, although the integrated manufacturer 
always benefits from remanufacturing, the remanufacturing opportunity may 
constitute a lose-lose situation to the supplier and the non-integrated 
manufacturer, making their profits be lower than in an identical supply chain 
without remanufacturing. In addition, the non-integrated manufacturer may be 
worse off with a lower remanufacturing cost or a larger return rate of used 
products due to the interaction with the supplier. We further demonstrate that the 
government-subsidised remanufacturing in the non-integrated (integrated) 
manufacturer is detrimental (beneficial) to the environment.  
Keywords: Supply chain management; Closed-loop supply chain; 
Remanufacturing; Environmental impact; Government subsidy 
 
1. Introduction 
Remanufacturing is “a production strategy whose goal is to recover the residual value of 
used products by reusing components that are still functioning well” (Debo et al., 2005). 
Its economic and environmental implications have gotten a lot of publicity. As a natural 
low-cost alternative to the traditional manufacturing, remanufacturing can play an 
important role in increasing profits, as shown by successful examples from many 
  
industries (Geyer et al., 2007). In addition, remanufacturing enjoys a green reputation 
since it reduces the disposal of used products and consumes less natural resources and 
energy than manufacturing all-new products (Giuntini and Gaudette, 2003). Therefore, 
environmental groups and governments are increasingly encouraging manufacturers to 
engage in remanufacturing (Hammond and Beullens, 2007; Ma et al, 2013). For 
instance, the Chinese Government launched a pilot programme in 2010, providing 
subsidies to a few selected manufacturers that had no remanufacturing experiences to 
develop remanufacturing technologies and build reverse logistic networks (China 
NDRC, 2010).  
Nevertheless, most manufacturers do not choose to remanufacture their products. 
Such a phenomenon is explained mainly from the resource-based view: most 
manufacturers do not possess the infrastructure and expertise to collect used products 
and remanufacture them in a profitable manner (Ferguson, 2010). Even if 
remanufacturing is independently profitable, manufacturers may still ignore this option 
due to concerns about the cannibalisation of higher-margin new product sales (Atasu et 
al., 2010; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006). At the same time, the positive environmental 
profile of remanufacturing is being challenged by latest theoretical findings. Galbreth et 
al. (2012) shows that remanufacturing can actually increase total virgin material usage 
because introducing remanufactured products at a low price to the market increases the 
overall demand. Agrawal et al. (2012b) finds that leasing is not always greener than 
selling, so encouraging remanufacturing, which raises the value of off-lease product and 
makes leasing more profitable, may lead to heavier environmental burden.  
When modelling the closed-loop supply chain, like most of the literature on 
remanufacturing, all above mentioned analytic studies assume that the production of the 
whole new product is done by an integrated manufacturer. But does the interaction on 
new product production make no difference to the performance of closed-loop supply 
chains with remanufacturing? To answer this question, in this paper, we model and 
investigate a decentralised closed-loop supply chain consisting of a key component 
supplier and a non-integrated manufacturer.  
This research is motivated by the pilot programme of auto part remanufacturing 
in China launched by Chinese National Development and Reform Commission 
(Xinhuanet.com, 2008). Three auto enterprises such as China First Automobile Group 
are selected and supported by the government to remanufacture auto parts. However, 
  
unlike their western or Japanese counterparts, most Chinese auto manufacturers 
generally have no capacity to design and produce high-quality key components such as 
automotive engine and gearboxes. They are heavily dependent on key component 
suppliers. Thus, when these manufacturers engage in remanufacturing, not surprisingly, 
a great part of the remanufactured product will be initially produced by their suppliers. 
Intuitively, the remanufactured product will erode the demand for new components. 
With anticipation of the remanufacturing opportunity, a supplier, especially a key 
component supplier with the dominant channel power, can respond by strategically 
adjusting the new component price, which in turn influences the manufacturer’s 
remanufacturing decision. To focus on the impact of the interaction between the key 
component supplier and the non-integrated manufacturer on the economic and 
environmental implications of remanufacturing, we consider a simple bilateral 
monopoly, as depicted in Figure 1. Here, in accordance with industrial practices 
(Fleischmann et al., 2003), we specify that the process of remanufacturing is on the 
level of the component rather than the whole product. The collected used products are 
disassembled into their constituent components, which are processed, reassembled, 
tested and made ready for sale as remanufactured products. In such a context, this paper 
seeks to provide a better understanding on the following research questions:  
• If the remanufacturing cost is sufficiently low to overcome the negative impact 
of cannibalisation on new product sales, should the manufacturer always engage 
in remanufacturing?  
• When engaging in remanufacturing, can the manufacturer be always better off 
by lowering the remanufacturing cost or enlarging the return rate of used 
products?  
• Are the manufacturer’s remanufacturing activities, especially the government-
subsidised remanufacturing activities, always beneficial to the environment?  
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Figure 1. The decentralised closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing 
  
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 introduces the assumptions and notations. Sections 4 analyses the 
performance of an integrated manufacturer as a benchmark. Section 5 analyses the 
performance of the decentralised closed-loop supply chain. Section 6 examines the 
environmental implications of remanufacturing. Section 7 concludes this research.  
2. Relevant Literature 
Our work mainly draws on and contributes to the current literature on managing closed-
loop supply chains with remanufacturing. For an overview of this research field, we 
refer the reader to Atasu et al. (2008a) and Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009). Earlier 
efforts focus on optimal strategies in an integrated system with only one decision-maker. 
However, closed-loop supply chains generally involve many more independent players 
than traditional supply chains. Therefore, there has been emerging research interests in 
either the competitive strategy or the supply chain interaction of multiple decision-
makers in the closed-loop context. However, note that these two literature streams 
typically assume the whole new product is produced by an integrated manufacturer.  
The literature on competition in remanufacturing generally employs game theory 
to model pricing/production quantity decisions for an integrated manufacturer facing 
competition from independent remanufacturers (Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2006; Ferrer 
and Swaminathan, 2010; Majumder and Groenevelt, 2001). These studies conclude that 
the entry of independent remanufacturers is detrimental to the manufacturer, and 
suggest that the manufacturer should remanufacture or collect used products to pre-empt 
new entrants (Ferguson and Toktay, 2006). Heese et al. (2005) and Atasu et al. (2008b) 
analyse the profitability of remanufacturing under a direct manufacturer competition. 
Their results show that remanufacturing can be an effective marketing strategy that 
allows an integrated manufacturer to defend its market share via price discrimination. 
Debo et al. (2005) solves joint technology selection and pricing decisions for new and 
remanufactured products faced by an integrated manufacturer, and extend their model to 
the case of multiple competing remanufactures. They discover that new and 
remanufactured products may exhibit the characteristics of complementary products 
because remanufacturing requires used products as cores.  
  
The impacts of interactions between supply chain partners on the performance of 
closed-loop supply chains are highlighted by many studies. Ostlin et al. (2008) shows 
that remanufacturing becomes more effective when there is a clear win-win situation for 
all players. Savaskan et al. (2004) explores the problem of choosing the appropriate 
reverse channel structure for collecting used products, Karakayali et al. (2007) and Kaya 
(2010) analyse decentralised collection and processing operations between a collector 
and a remanufacturer. In these three papers, two-part tariff contracts are designed to 
coordinate the channel. Bhattacharya et al. (2006) addresses the problem of determining 
the optimal order quantity by analysing interactions among a retailer, an integrated 
manufacturer, and an independent remanufacturer. In their model, new and 
remanufactured products are perfect substitutes, and the remanufacturer sells 
remanufactured products through the manufacturer. Thus, the remanufacturer actually 
acts as a low-cost supplier, though its production capacity is bounded by new product 
sales.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers involving the supplier 
when investigating the operational performance of closed-loop supply chains. Aras et al. 
(2006) considers a hybrid manufacturing/remanufacturing system in which a non-
integrated manufacturer purchases new components from the supplier and 
remanufactures used products. In their model, the manufacturer is the only decision-
maker, so the interaction with the supplier is ignored. Jacobs and Subramanian (2012) 
examine the effects of sharing product recovery responsibility between a supplier and a 
non-integrated manufacturer. In their model, both virgin material and recycled material 
are provided by the supplier, so there is no direct competition within the supply chain. 
In contrast, with the opportunity to remanufacture used products, the non-integrated 
manufacturer in our model is a rival as well as a buyer to the supplier. Thus, this paper 
is the first to bridge the above two literature streams and integrate both competition 
concerns and supply chain partnership concerns in the closed-loop supply chain context. 
Although a few forward supply chain models have investigated the implications of 
coopetition, they do not capture the unique characteristic of the remanufacturing context: 
the new component and the remanufactured component can be not only substitutes but 
also complements, which dramatically shapes players’ decisions. Their focuses are the 
impacts of coopetition on corporate governance or channel structure (e.g., Arya et al 
2008, and Lim and Tan 2010). In contrast, we consider a static channel structure, as 
  
illustrated in Figure 1, and examine the impacts of coopetition within the forward 
supply chain on the player’s remanufacturing strategy. Our analytic results show that 
the interaction between the supplier and the manufacturer is critical to the economic and 
environmental performances of the closed-loop supply chain.  
3. Assumptions and Notations 
The context of our model is illustrated in Figure 1. The key feature of our model lies in 
that a part of the new product (the new component) is assumed to be initially produced 
by the supplier, and then the manufacturer’s remanufacturing activities will erode the 
demand for the supplier’s new components. Table 1 summarises the notations. Other 
key assumptions are outlined and discussed below.  
Table 1. Parameters and Decisions Variables 
Symbol Definition 
Q  The market size 
δ  The consumer value discount for remanufactured products 
φ  The return rate factor of used products 
,n rc c  The unit production cost of the new/remanufactured component 
,n rp p  The new/remanufactured product price 
w  The new component price 
,n rq q  The production quantity of new/remanufactured products 
iΠ  The player i ’s profit, { }, ,i I S NI∈  
 
ASSUMPTION 1. Remanufacturing a used component does not cost more than 
manufacturing a new one, i.e., r nc c≤ , and rc  is constant for all remanufactured 
components.  
  
As the foregoing specification, the process of remanufacturing in this paper is on 
the level of the component. Without loss of generality, we assume that each final 
product contains one component. Except for the cost to obtain a new/remanufactured 
component, the manufacturer’s other costs to (re)assemble, test and make ready for sale 
as the new/remanufactured product are constant and normalised to zero. Giuntini and 
Gaudette (2003) affirm that remanufacturing costs 40-65% less than traditional 
manufacturing. Here, the difference between nc  and rc  stands for the cost advantage of 
remanufacturing. Fleischmann (2001) illustrates that the assumption of constant unit 
remanufacturing cost is a reasonable first-order approach for many cases. And, it can be 
easily shown that the manufacturer’s incentives to remanufacture used products will be 
enhanced (reduced) by a remanufacturing cost with economies (diseconomies) of scale.  
ASSUMPTION 2. The consumer willingness-to-pay ν  of new product is 
heterogeneous and uniformly distributed in [ ]0,Q . Without loss of generality, we 
assume a density of 1 in this interval.  
Assumption 2 is widely-accepted in modelling the consumers' heterogeneity 
(e.g., Agrawal et al. 2012b, Ferguson and Toktay 2006). It implies that the potential 
market size is Q , and the upper limitation of consumer willingness-to-pay is also Q . 
Our model, however, unlike the literature on forward supply chain management, does 
not require nc Q≤  to guarantee a positive production quantity. In Section 5, we will 
discuss the reasons why the manufacturer may keep producing new products even 
( )n rQ c Q Q cφ δ< ≤ + − .  
ASSUMPTION 3. For each consumer, the willingness-to-pay ratio of a 
remanufactured product to a new one is ( )0,1δ ∈ .  
Assumption 3 frames a vertical differentiation model where consumers’ 
valuation has an agreed order, i.e. all consumers prefer a new product to a 
remanufactured one. Earlier studies on remanufacturing routinely assume that the 
consumer cannot differentiate new and remanufactured products, and have the same 
willingness-to-pay for them. The latest empirical evidence and experimental results, 
however, show remanufactured products are usually valued much lower by consumers 
(see Guide and Li 2010, and Agrawal et al. 2012a). According to Assumptions 2 and 3, 
the linear inverse demand functions for new and remanufactured products are as follows. 
  
We refer to the reader to Ferguson and Toktay (2006) for how to derive demand 
functions in detail.  
 n n rp Q q qδ= − − ,  (1) 
 ( )r n rp Q q qδ= − − .  (2) 
ASSUMPTION 4. All decisions are considered in a steady state period: the 
supplier moves first to price the new component, and then the manufacturer determines 
the production quantity of new/remanufactured products.  
One of the key features of remanufacturing is that the production quantity of 
remanufactured products is bounded by the quantity of used products that are available 
for remanufacturing. In general, only a portion, [ ]0,1φ ∈ , of used products can be 
collected by the manufacturer. By assuming the product can be used only one period, 
the quantity of used products in current period is equal to the production quantity of 
new products in the previous period. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) introduce the 
philosophy of the steady state in managing new and remanufactured products: the 
players use the same policy in every period after the ramp-up in the first period in an 
infinite horizon setting. Thus, in this paper, for the sake of tractability, we focus on the 
players’ decisions in a single period and assume that r nq qφ≤ . Note that, 0φ >  means 
the manufacturer has a remanufacturing opportunity, 0φ =  no remanufacturing 
opportunity.  
ASSUMPTION 5. The production quantity of new products is used as a proxy of 
the supply chain’s environmental performance.  
Because remanufacturing a used product can eliminate its disposal impact, and 
consumes less natural resources and energy than manufacturing all-new products 
(Giuntini and Gaudette, 2003), a consensus in researchers and policy-makers is that one 
unit remanufactured product’s life-cycle environmental impact is much smaller than one 
unit new product’s. Without a great loss of generality, we assume that one unit 
remanufactured product’s life-cycle environmental impact is zero, and then the supply 
chain’s environmental performance is equal to one unit new product’s life-cycle 
environmental impact multiplied by the production quantity of new products. Therefore, 
nq  can be a proxy.  
  
ASSUMPTION 6. The effect of government subsidies is to make the 
manufacturer that did not remanufacture used products start remanufacturing.  
When examining the environmental implication of remanufacturing, we are 
concerned especially about the environmental implication of the government-subsidised 
remanufacturing. Here, we assume that only when remanufacturing is not profitable and 
the manufacturer does not remanufacture used products, the government will provide 
the subsidies. With the subsidies, remanufacturing becomes profitable for the 
manufacturer, but the cost advantage of remanufacturing is still small (otherwise the 
government can reduce the subsidies).  
In addition, we also assume that all players in our model are risk-neutral and 
profit seeking, and have access to the same information. The fixed investment of setting 
up the collection system and processing operations for remanufacturing is assumed to be 
insignificant. In this paper, we focus on voluntary collecting and remanufacturing. Thus, 
the manufacturer can collect only those used products he will remanufacture1.  
In the following analysis, subscript { }, ,i I S NI∈
 
refers to the integrated 
manufacturer, the component supplier and the non-integrated manufacturer, respectively; 
superscripts { },j I D∈  the integrated manufacturer and the decentralised supply chain, 
respectively. The players’ strategic decisions are analysed under various scenarios, 
which are distinguished by parameters nc , rc  and φ . Superscript { }, ,k A B C∈  denotes 
the scenario under which our analysis is proceeding.  
4. Integrated Manufacturer Model 
In this section, we analyse the performance of an integrated manufacturer as a 
benchmark. An integrated manufacturer that can produce the whole new produce is 
equivalent to a perfectly coordinated supply chain. Its optimisation problem is  
                                                 
1
 How to match demand and supply for remanufacturing is a substantive and interesting issue, 
but beyond the scope of this paper. Please refer to Guide et al. (2003), Minner and 
Kiesmüller (2012), Teunter and Flapper (2011), and Xiong and Li (2012) for related 
research.  
  
 ( )( ) ( )( )
,
max , ,
n r
I n n r n n r n r r rq q
p q q c q p q q c qΠ = − + − ,  (3) 
subject to r nq qφ≤ , , 0n rq q ≥ . The integrated manufacturer’s optimal decisions are 
characterised by the following proposition. The proofs of all propositions are provided 
in Appendixes.  
PROPOSITION 1. The integrated manufacturer’s optimal production quantity 
decisions are:  
Decision I-A, ( ) 2IAn nq Q c= − , 0IArq = , when r n rc c c δ≤ < ;  
Decision I-B, ( ) ( )2 1IBn n rq Q c Q cδ δ= − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , ( ) ( )2 1IBr n rq c c δ δ= − − , 
when 0r n nc c cδ ≤ ≤ ;  
Decision I-C, ( ) ( )22 1 2ICn n rq Q c Q cφ δ δφ δφ= − + − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
( ) ( )22 1 2ICr n rq Q c Q cφ φ δ δφ δφ= − + − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , when ( )0n n rc c Q Q cφ δ< ≤ + − ; here 
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1 1n rc Q cδ φ δ φ φ= − + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ .  
Intuitively, when making a production quantity decision, the integrated 
manufacturer examines the trade-off between the profit from remanufacturing and the 
cannibalisation of new product sales. When nc  is small ( n rc c δ< ), the cost savings 
from remanufacturing are insufficient to overcome the negative impact of 
cannibalisation, then the integrated manufacturer will produce only new products. In 
contrast, if nc  is large ( n rc c δ> ), the benefit due to market segmentation outweigh the 
cannibalisation, then the integrated manufacturer will produce both new and 
remanufactured products. And, when 0n nc c< , the optimal production quantity of 
remanufactured products is less than the quantity of new products that are available for 
remanufacturing. As a result, only a portion of available cores will be collected and 
remanufactured ( IB IB
r nq qφ< ). But, when 0n nc c> , the unconstrained optimal production 
quantity of remanufactured products exceeds the quantity of available cores. 
Consequently, all available cores will be remanufactured ( IC IC
r nq qφ= ), and then, similar 
to Debo et al. (2005), we say new and remanufactured products exhibit the 
characteristics of both complements and substitutes. By contrast, we say two products 
are pure substitutes when only a portion of available cores is remanufactured.  
  
Substituting the integrated manufacturer’s optimal decisions in Proposition 1 
back into its optimisation problem gives the integrated manufacturer’s profit (as shown 
in Table B1 in Appendixes). The following result characterises how this profit is shaped 
by the cost parameters ( nc  and rc ) and return rate factor (φ )2. In all results of this paper, 
the signs + , −  and 0  denote an increase, decrease and no-change in equilibrium, in 
response to a marginal increase of the corresponding parameter, respectively.  
RESULT 1. (i) The following are true:  
Parameters IAIΠ  
IB
IΠ  
IC
IΠ  
nc  −  −  −  
r
c  0  −  −  
φ  0  0  +  
(ii) 
n r n r
IA IB
I c c I c cδ δ= =Π = Π , 0 0n n n n
IB IC
I c c I c c= =Π = Π .  
Result 1 reveals that the integrated manufacturer’s profit is decreasing in nc , 
non-increasing in rc , and non-decreasing in φ . Thus, it is safe to say the integrated 
manufacturer always benefits from the opportunity to remanufacture used products, i.e., 
0 0I Iφ φ> =Π ≥ Π . Like the existing literature (e.g., Atasu et al., 2010; Ferguson and 
Toktay, 2006), we affirm that the integrated manufacturer should engaging in 
remanufacturing when the remanufacturing cost is sufficiently low ( n rc c δ> ) to 
overcome the negative cannibalisation impact on new product sales, and then the 
integrated manufacturer is always better off with a lower remanufacturing cost or a 
larger return rate.  
5. Decentralised Supply Chain Model 
In this section, the performance of a decentralised supply chain consisting of a key 
component supplier and a non-integrated manufacturer is analysed. Firstly, we solve the 
                                                 
2
 It is worth noting that the separating values between different scenarios also depend on these 
parameters, same for Results 2, 3 and 4.  
  
players’ optimisation problems. And then we examine how the players’ decisions and 
profits are shaped by model parameters.  
5.1 Optimisation problem analysis 
In the decentralised supply chain, the game between the supplier and the non-integrated 
manufacturer can be analysed using backward induction. By taking a given w , the non-
integrated manufacturer determines nq  and rq  to maximise his profit function:  
 ( )( ) ( )( )
,
max , ,
n r
NI n n r n r n r r rq q
p q q w q p q q c qΠ = − + − ,  (4) 
subject to: r nq qφ≤ , , 0n rq q ≥ . The solutions of the non-integrated manufacturer’s 
optimisation problem are shown in Proposition 2.  
PROPOSITION 2. The non-integrated manufacturer’s optimal production 
quantity decisions with respect to the supplier’s new component price are:  
Decision NI-A, ( ) 2DAnq Q w= − , 0DArq = , when rw c δ< ;  
Decision NI-B, ( ) ( )2 1DBn rq Q w Q cδ δ= − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , ( ) ( )2 1DBr rq w c δ δ= − − , 
when 0rc w wδ ≤ ≤ ;  
Decision NI-C, ( ) ( )22 1 2DCn rq Q w Q cφ δ δφ δφ= − + − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
( ) ( )22 1 2DCr rq Q w Q cφ φ δ δφ δφ= − + − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , when ( )0 rw w Q Q cφ δ< ≤ + − ; here, 
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1 1rw Q cδ φ δ φ φ= − + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ .  
When setting w , the supplier does so with anticipation that the non-integrated 
manufacturer will react as characterised by Proposition 2. If the supplier anticipates that 
the non-integrated manufacturer will take Decision NI-A, then her corresponding 
optimal decision is denoted as Decision S-A. The optimisation problem turns out to be:  
 ( )maxDA DA DA DAS n nw w c qΠ = − , (5) 
subject to: DA
r
w c δ< . This constraint, which is exactly the necessary condition for 
Decision NI-A, ensures that the non-integrated manufacturer will take Decision NI-A. 
By examining the non-integrated manufacturer’s all possible reactions, we get the 
supplier’s optimal new component pricing decisions, as follows.  
  
PROPOSITION 3. The supplier’s optimal new component pricing decisions with 
respect to the new component production cost are:  
Decision S-A, ( ) 2DA nw Q c= + , when 1r n nc c c≤ < ;  
Decision S-B-1, 1DB
r
w c δ− = , when { }1 2 3min ,n n n nc c c c≤ < ;  
Decision S-B-2, ( ) ( )2 2 2DB n rw Q c Q cδ− = + − − , when 3 4n n nc c c≤ < ;  
Decision S-C, ( ) ( )2 2DC n rw Q c Q cφ δ= + + − , when { }2 4 5max ,n n n nc c c c≤ ≤ ; 
here, 1 2n rc c Qδ= − , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )22 2 3 2 2 1 1 2n r rc c Q Q cδ δ δφ φ δφ φ δφ δφ⎡ ⎤= − − − + − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , 
( ) ( )3 2 1 1n rc c Qδ δ= − − − , 
( ) ( ) ( )( )24 1 1 1 1 1 21 r rn
c c
c Q Qδ φ δφ δ δφ δφφ δ δ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
= − + + − − − + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, 
( )5n rc Q Q cφ δ= + − .  
It is worth noting that the supplier has taken the non-integrated manufacturer’s 
optimal reaction into account when setting w . So, if the supplier’s optimal decision is 
Decision S-k, then the non-integrated manufacturer’s optimal decision must be Decision 
NI-k. It is worth noting that Propositions 1 and 3 reveal an interesting phenomenon: 
either an integrated or a non-integrated manufacturer will keep producing new products 
even nc Q> . This is because, in our model, the manufacturer’s profit comes from the 
sales of both new and remanufactured products. When ( )n rQ c Q Q cφ δ< ≤ + − , 
producing new products alone is not profitable, but it can generate available cores, and 
then the manufacturer can make a profit by remanufacturing used (new) products; when 
( )n rc Q Q cφ δ> + − , however, the profit due to remanufacturing cannot compensate for 
the loss due to new product sales, and then there is no production.  
5.2 Decision analysis 
Based on Proposition 3, we now examine how cost parameters ( nc  and rc ) and return 
rate factor (φ ) shape the supplier’s optimal decisions. The impacts of parameters are 
presented in Result 2 and illustrated in Figure 2. Note that, in Figures 2 – 6, we set 
10Q = , 1 2δ = , 3 4φ = , 4rc =  for (a) and 6nc =  for (b).  
  
RESULT 2. (i) The following are true:  
Parameter DAw 1DBw − 2DBw − DCw
nc
 
+
 
0
 
+
 
+
 
r
c
 
0
 
+
 
+
 
−
 
φ
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
+
 
(ii) 
1 1
1
n r n r
DA DB
c c c cw w
−
= =
= ; 
3 3
1 2
n r n r
DB DB
c c c cw w
− −
= =
= ; 
{ } { }2 4 2 4max , max ,n n n n n n
DB DC
c c c c c c
w w
= =
< .  
(a)
Decision
S-A
Decision
S-B-1/2
Decision
S-C
Dw
 (b)
Decision
S-A
Decision
S-C
Dw
 
Figure 2. Optimal new component price 
 
Firstly, Result 2 indicates that the supplier’s new component price Dw  is non-
decreasing in nc . Since nc  is the unit cost for the supplier to produce the new 
component, there should be no surprise when Dw  increases in it. However, when the 
supplier’s optimal decision is Decision S-B-1, the non-integrated manufacturer’s 
remanufacturing business just heads into a profitable territory. Then, rather than 
competing with the remanufactured product in the market, a more profitable strategy for 
the supplier is to price in an offensive way which drives the remanufactured product out 
of the market. As a result, the supplier strategically does not care how costly 
  
manufacturing the new component is, but how costly remanufacturing the used 
component is.  
Result 2 also reveals the impact of the remanufactured component unit 
production cost rc  on Dw : when rc  is close to nc , Dw  is independent of rc ; as rc  
declines, Dw  becomes at first increasing and eventually decreasing in it. The intuition 
for this result is as follows. According to Propositions 2 and 3, when nc  is small (the 
supplier’s optimal decision is Decision S-A, and the non-integrated manufacturer’s is 
Decision NI-A), the insignificant cost saving from remanufacturing cannot cover its 
shortage of consumer disutility. Then the non-integrated manufacturer would not 
remanufacture any used products, so both players do not take rc  into account when 
deciding their actions. When nc  is moderate (optimal decisions are Decisions S-B and 
NI-B), the non-integrated manufacturer will remanufacture a part of available cores 
( DB DB
r nq qφ> ), then the remanufactured component is purely a substitute for the new 
component, so DBw  is increasing in rc . When nc  is big (optimal decisions are Decisions 
S-C and NI-C), all available cores are remanufactured ( DC DC
r nq qφ= ), implying that the 
remanufactured component is purely a complement for the new product for a given φ , 
so DCw  is then decreasing in rc .  
A larger φ  means a larger portion of used products are available for 
remanufacturing. We once naively expected to observe that Dw  decreases in φ . 
However, Result 2 shows a contrasting view: Dw  is always non-decreasing in φ . When 
nc  is small, it is clear that DAw  is independent of φ  since the non-integrated 
manufacturer then produces only the new product. When nc  is moderate, although new 
and remanufactured products compete with each other in the market, the parameter φ  
still has no influence on the competition because only a part of available cores are 
remanufactured. When nc  is big, new and remanufactured products exhibit the 
characteristics of complements as well as substitutes. Then, for a given Dw , a bigger φ  
allows more remanufactured products enter into the market. The supplier could choose 
to decrease Dw  to intensely compete, but the ill effect of this choice is that more used 
products will be available for remanufacturing, further weakening the supplier’s 
competitive position. So, the right decision for the supplier is to increase Dw . Not only 
  
can such a strategy improve the marginal profit, but also cut down the quantity of 
available cores. Therefore, we observe that DCw  is increasing in φ .  
Substituting the supplier’s optimal new component pricing decisions in 
Proposition 3 back into the non-integrated manufacturer’s optimal production quantity 
reaction with respect to w  in Proposition 2 gives the non-integrated manufacturer’s 
optimal production quantity decisions (as shown in Table B2 in Appendixes). The shape 
of the non-integrated manufacturer’s optimal decisions is characterised by the following 
result and illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.  
RESULT 3. (i) The following are true:  
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Result 3 describes how model parameters shape the non-integrated 
manufacturer’s optimal production quantity decisions. It is quite intuitive that the 
optimal production quantity of new (remanufactured) products is non-increasing in their 
own cost parameter nc  ( rc ). When the manufacturer’s optimal decision is Decision NI-
B-1, the supplier takes an offensive pricing strategy, making the manufacturer prefer to 
set 1 0DB
r
q − = . Because 1DBw −  is independent of nc  and increasing in rc , 1DBnq −  is 
independent of nc  and decreasing in rc . When the manufacturer’s optimal decision is 
Decision NI-B-2, new and remanufactured products are pure substitutes. So the optimal 
  
production quantities of two products are increasing in each other’s cost parameter. In 
contrast, when the manufacturer’s optimal decision is Decision NI-C, for a given φ , 
new and remanufactured products are pure complements since DC DC
r nq qφ= . So the 
optimal production quantities of two products are decreasing in each other’s cost 
parameter.  
(a)
D
nq
 (b)
D
e
c
is
io
n
 N
I-B
-1
/2
D
nq
 
Figure 3. Optimal new product production quantity 
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Figure 4. Optimal remanufactured product production quantity 
 
When the manufacturer’s optimal decision is Decision NI-A or Decision NI-B, 
then no or only a part of available cores will be remanufactured. Thus, the return rate 
factor φ  has no impact on the non-integrated manufacturer’s decisions. When the 
manufacturer’s optimal decision is Decision NI-C, all available cores are 
  
remanufactured. It is very important to note that when we investigate the impact of φ , 
unlike the analysis with a given φ , the relationship between DCnq  and DCrq  should be 
viewed as both complements and substitutes. Intuitively, DC
r
q  is increasing in φ . The 
effect of complementary relationship makes DC
nq  increase in φ , while the effect of 
substitutive relationship makes DC
nq  decrease in φ . Consequently, when 
( ) ( ) ( )2 21 2 1 2 1n rc Q cδ φ δφ δφ δ φ⎡ ⎤> + + + − +⎣ ⎦ , the complementary effect dominates, 
and then DC
nq  is increasing in φ ; otherwise, the substitutive effect dominates, and then 
DC
nq  is decreasing in φ .  
5.3 Profit analysis 
Substituting the supplier’s optimal new component pricing decisions in Proposition 3 
and the non-integrated manufacturer’s optimal production quantity decisions in Table 
B2 back into the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s optimisation problems gives both 
players’ profits (as shown in Table B3 in Appendixes), illustrated in Figures 5 and 6.  
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Figure 5. The supplier’s profit  
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Figure 6. The non-integrated manufacturer’s profit  
 
Result 4 characterises players’ profits in the decentralised closed-loop supply 
chain. In our decentralised supply chain model, the supplier’s profit is from the sale of 
new components, so it is intuitive that her profit is decreasing in the new component 
cost parameter ( nc ). And, based on our foregoing description of the relationship 
between new and remanufactured products, it is also easy to understand that, when 
remanufacturing has a significant cost advantage, as rc  declines, the supplier’s profit at 
first increasing and eventually decreasing in it. For the non-integrated manufacturer, his 
profit is from the sales of new and remanufactured products. On one hand, the optimal 
new component price Dw  is non-decreasing in nc ; consequently, the manufacturer’s 
  
profit is non-increasing in nc . On the other hand, although the manufacturer’s profit is 
non-increasing in rc  when the cost structure makes him insist on taking a certain 
decision, yet his profit drops rapidly once the optimal decision changes from Decision 
NI-B to Decision NI-C as rc  declines. This is because, the decrease of rc  will make the 
supplier switch to charge a much higher price for new components, as shown in Figure 
2. Thus, looking at the whole picture, the non-integrated manufacturer’s profit is not 
always non-increasing in rc : a lower remanufacturing cost may result in a lower profit.  
When it comes to the impact of return rate factor φ , obviously, the supplier’s 
and the non-integrated manufacturer’s profits are independent of φ  when their optimal 
decisions are Decision S/NI-A or Decision S/NI-B, since then their decisions are 
independent of it (see Results 2 and 3). However, when the players’ optimal decisions 
are Decision S/NI-C, both players’ profits could be increasing or decreasing in φ  
contingent on the cost structure. For the non-integrated manufacturer, an increase of φ  
has two contradicting impacts on his profit. On one hand, such an increase enhances 
remanufactured product sales; on the other hand, it leads to a higher new component 
price and a smaller new product production quantity, and consequently a shrunk profit 
from new product sales. As a result, only if the new component cost parameter 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1n rc Q cδ δφ δφ δ φ> ⎡ − + + ⎤ +⎣ ⎦ , which implicates that there is a limited profit 
generated by new product sales to loss, the non-integrated manufacturer’s profit would 
increase in φ . For the supplier, a similar trade-off exists: the new component price is 
increasing in φ , leading to a higher marginal profit, but the production quantity of new 
products could be decreasing in φ . Thus, it also requires 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1n rc Q cδ δφ δφ δ φ> ⎡ − + + ⎤ +⎣ ⎦  to ensure the supplier’s profit increasing in φ .  
Although the integrated manufacturer is never harmed by the opportunity to 
remanufacture used products, Result 4 implies that, compared with the situation of no 
remanufacturing ( 0φ = ), both the supplier and the non-integrated manufacturer may 
earn lower profits when the manufacturer has the remanufacturing opportunity ( 0φ > ), 
as demonstrated by the following corollary.  
COROLLARY 1. (i) When 1r n nc c c≤ < , 0 0D DA DS S Sφ φ> =Π = Π = Π , 
0 0
D DA D
NI NI NIφ φ> =Π = Π = Π ;  
  
(ii) When { }1 2 4max ,n n n nc c c c< < , 0 0D DB DS S Sφ φ> =Π = Π < Π , 
0 0
D DB D
NI NI NIφ φ> =Π = Π > Π ;  
(iii) When { }2 4max ,n n n nc c c c ′< < , 0 0D DC DS S Sφ φ> =Π = Π < Π , 
0 0
D DC D
NI NI NIφ φ> =Π = Π < Π ;  
(iv) When 5n n nc c c′ < ≤ , 0 0D C DS S Sφ φ> =Π = Π > Π , 0 0D DC DNI NI NIφ φ> =Π = Π > Π ; here 
( ) ( ) ( )21 1 2 2n r rc Q c Q cδ φ δ δφ δφ δ φ⎡ ⎤′ = + + − − + + +⎣ ⎦ .  
When the cost advantage of remanufacturing is insignificant ( 1r n nc c c≤ < ), the 
non-integrated manufacturer does not remanufacture any used product. When the 
remanufacturing cost is sufficiently low to overcome the negative cannibalisation 
impact on new product sales, remanufacturing is a dominant strategy for the non-
integrated manufacturer, which can deliver a win-lose, a lose-lose, or a win-win 
situation to the decentralised supply chain contingent on the cost advantage of 
remanufacturing. When the cost advantage is small ( { }1 2 4max ,n n n nc c c c< < ), new and 
remanufactured products are pure substitutes, then the supplier has to cut new 
component price to respond the manufacturer’s remanufacturing activities. Thus, the 
non-integrated manufacturer can benefit from remanufactured product sales and a lower 
new component price, but the supplier is worse off. In contrast, when the cost advantage 
of remanufacturing is large ( 5n n nc c c′ < ≤ ), new and remanufactured products are 
complements, then the supplier can charge a higher new component price to share the 
remanufacturing benefit, then both players are better off. However, when the cost 
advantage is moderate ( { }2 4max ,n n n nc c c c ′< < ), the remanufacturing opportunity 
makes both players’ profits shrunk. In such a situation, for a given new component price, 
the manufacturer always chooses to remanufacture used products; and given the 
manufacturer’s remanufacturing choice, the supplier strategically responds by pricing 
new component higher. As a result, both players’ profits are then lower than in an 
identical supply chain without remanufacturing.  
6. Environmental Implications 
In this section, we analyse the environmental implications of remanufacturing. 
  
According to Assumption 5, we use the production quantity of new products as a proxy 
of the supply chain’s environmental performance. And, according to Assumption 6, we 
examine the environmental implications of government-subsidised remanufacturing by 
comparing the manufacturer’s production quantity of new products when Decisions 
I/NI-A and I/NI-B are taken.  
According to Proposition 1, the integrated manufacturer’s optimal new product 
production quantity is always ( ) 2nQ c−  when 0φ = . We have the following corollary.  
COROLLARY 2. (i) When r n rc c c δ≤ < , 0 0I IA In n nq q qφ φ> == = ;  
(ii) When 0r n nc c cδ < ≤ , 0 0I IB In n nq q qφ φ> == < ;  
(iii) When ( ) ( )0 1 2n n rc c Q cφ δ φ< < + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 0 0I IC In n nq q qφ φ> == < ;  
(iv) When ( ) ( ) ( )1 2r n rQ c c Q Q cφ δ φ φ δ+ + + < ≤ + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 0 0I IC In n nq q qφ φ> == > .  
Corollary 2 indicates that the government subsidising the integrated 
manufacturing to remanufacture used products has a positive environmental impact. If 
the remanufacturing cost declines because of the government subsidy, making the 
integrated manufacturer’s optimal decision switch from Decision I-A to Decision I-B, 
then less new products will be produced, which benefits the environment. However, 
Corollary 2 also shows that remanufacturing in the integrated manufacturer may have a 
negative environmental impact when new and remanufactured products exhibit the 
characteristics of complements. This is because, if the cost advantage of 
remanufacturing is large enough, i.e., ( ) ( )1 2n rc Q cφ δ φ> + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , the integrated 
manufacturer will strategically produce more new products to generate more available 
cores and exploit the benefit of remanufacturing. This finding shares a similar economic 
intuition behind Lee (2012), which shows that if the waste stream in a manufacturing 
process can be converted into a saleable by-product, the manufacturer may strategically 
overproduce the original product to increase the amount of waste generated.  
For the non-integrated manufacturer, based on Table B2 in Appendixes, we have 
the following corollary.  
COROLLARY 3. (i) When 1r n nc c c≤ < , 0 0D DA Dn n nq q qφ φ> == = ;  
(ii) When { }1 2 4max ,n n n nc c c c< < , 0 0D DB Dn n nq q qφ φ> == > ;  
  
(iii) When { } ( ) ( )2 4max , 1 2n n n rc c c Q cφ δ φ< < + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 0 0D DC Dn n nq q qφ φ> == < ;  
(iv) When ( ) ( ) 51 2r n nQ c c cφ δ φ+ + + < ≤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 0 0D DC Dn n nq q qφ φ> == > .  
On one hand, similar to Corollary 2, Corollary 3 shows that, when new and 
remanufactured products exhibit the characteristics of complements, the non-integrated 
manufacturer also produces more new products, though the supplier then charges a 
higher new component price. On the other hand, unlike Corollary 2, Corollary 3 reveals 
that the government-subsidised remanufacturing in the non-integrated manufacturer has 
a negative environmental impact. If the remanufacturing cost declines because of the 
government subsidy, making the non-integrated manufacturer’s optimal decision switch 
from Decision NI-A to Decision NI-B, then the remanufactured product is a pure 
substitute to the new product, and erodes the demand for the supplier’s new components. 
Consequently, the supplier will strategically lower the new component price, making 
the non-integrated manufacturer be better off by producing more new products.  
7. Conclusions 
Closed-loop supply chain management is a hot research topic because of its sustainable 
profile. The current literature focuses on the interaction within the reverse supply chain 
or the competition between an integrated manufacturer and an independent 
remanufacturer. The impact of the interaction within the forward supply chain on the 
new/remanufactured product production is rarely studied. In this paper, we model and 
analyse a decentralised closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing consisting of a 
key component supplier and a non-integrated manufacturer. Our analytic results show 
that the interaction between these two players has significant impacts on the economic 
and environmental implications of remanufacturing. We summarise the main findings 
and discuss their managerial insights as follows.  
To begin with, the strategic issue for the manufacturer is whether to capitalise on 
remanufacturing. This research coincides with the current literature that the opportunity 
of remanufacturing always benefits an integrated manufacturer, which should engage in 
remanufacturing once the remanufacturing cost is sufficiently low to overcome the 
negative cannibalisation effect. But, after we consider the interaction with the key 
component supplier, remanufacturing may present a win-lose, a win-win, or even a lose-
lose solution to the decentralised closed-loop supply chain (see Corollary 1). That is to 
  
say, the integrated manufacturer’s “meat” may be the non-integrated manufacturer’s 
“poison”. This finding provides a new perspective to answer this question – why most 
manufacturers do not remanufacture their products even the remanufacturing business 
seems to be so profitable. A key component supplier’s strategic responses significantly 
change the non-integrated manufacturer’s incentives. When remanufacturing forms a 
lose-lose solution, which may be further exaggerated by the competition from 
independent remanufacturers, the supplier and the manufacturer should eliminate the 
remanufacturing opportunity. So, designing products to prevent remanufacturing in 
practice does not come as a surprise (see Agrawal et al., 2012a).  
Secondly, the tactical issues in remanufacturing are whether to reduce the 
remanufacturing cost and enlarge the return rate of used products. No existing literature 
says no to this question, many papers in technology management and industrial 
engineering contribute to deliver a lower remanufacturing cost or a larger return rate 
(see Srivastava, 2007 for a review). But, our analysis shows that, although the 
conventional view works in the case of an integrated manufacturer, the non-integrated 
manufacturer may be worse off with a lower remanufacturing cost or a larger return rate 
because of the interaction with the component supplier (see Result 4). This finding 
highlights the importance of examining the key component supplier’s responses before 
the non-integrated manufacturer carries out the incremental cost-reducing innovation for 
remanufacturing or improve the efficiency of reverse logistics network.  
Lastly, we outline the environmental implications of remanufacturing, especially 
the government-subsidised remanufacturing. Even if the life-cycle environmental 
impact of remanufactured products is assumed to be zero, remanufacturing cannot 
always deliver a positive effect to the environment. When new and remanufactured 
products exhibit the characteristics of complements, both the integrated and non-
integrated manufacturers will strategically produce more new products, increasing the 
consumption of natural resources and energy and aggravating the environmental burden. 
When two products are pure substitutes, the integrated manufacturer will produce less 
new products, but the non-integrated manufacturer will still produce more new product. 
Thus, a simple subsidy policy encouraging the non-integrated manufacturer that did not 
remanufacture used product to launch a remanufacturing project will be detrimental to 
the environment. In order to deliver a sustainable solution via remanufacturing, the 
  
government could deliberate on sharing the subsidies across the closed-loop supply 
chain, as suggested by Mitra and Webster (2008).  
Although this research points out the potential negative effect of 
remanufacturing on the environmental and economic performances of the decentralised 
supply chain, we do not seek to discourage remanufacturing. On the contrary, this 
research systemically rediscovers the complexity of closed-loop supply chains with 
remanufacturing, which requires much more effort than we thought to deliver a greener 
and more profitable solution. A simple policy to spur more remanufacturing activities 
may be detrimental to both the environment and the industry.  
In closing this paper, we discuss its limitations and highlight possible avenues 
for future research3. Firstly, our model focuses on a decentralised closed-loop supply 
chain where the supplier enjoys a dominant channel power and can move first by 
pricing the new component to share the non-integrated manufacture’s remanufacturing 
profits. While this is consistent with a number of industries such as auto part 
remanufacturing in China, there are also many cases where this assumption does not 
hold. We speculate that a powerful non-integrated manufacturer may simply propose a 
different type of contract to seize all remanufacturing profits, and operates like an 
integrated manufacturer. Even if being not so powerful to seize all remanufacturing 
profits, the non-integrated manufacturer can strategically decentralise its manufacturing 
and remanufacturing operations to obtain a greater profit (see Zhou et al. 2012). 
Secondly, our model considers only short term decisions like pricing and production 
quantity. A simple two-part tariff contract can be used to coordinate such a 
decentralised closed-loop supply chain (see Karakayali et al. 2007, Kaya 2010, and 
Savaskan et al. 2004). Our model can be extended to incorporated long term decisions 
like design for product recovery (e.g., Wu, 2012). Then the supplier seems to face an 
interesting paradox: producing better components with a higher level of 
remanufacturability, but losing more business since those components can be 
remanufactured more often. In this case, how to coordinate the decentralised supply 
chain is worth a great effort. Lastly, like most literature on closed-loop supply chain 
management, our analytic results heavily depend on the price-response function in 
                                                 
3
 We highly appreciate two anonymous reviewers’ comments and suggestions in identifying 
limitations and future research directions of this paper.  
  
Equations (1) and (2). Although this demand function is backed by some empirical and 
experimental evidences, Ovchinnikov (2011) finds that the fiction of consumers who 
switch from new to remanufactured product has an inverted-U shape with respect to the 
remanufactured product price. Thus, a fruitful direction of future research is to conduct 
more empirical and experimental study to understand the underlying consumer 
behaviour, and examine the sensitivity or robustness of our results.  
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See the “Supplementary material”.  
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Highlights 
• We model a closed-loop supply chain in which the manufacturer can 
remanufacture used products.  
• The interaction with the supplier significantly impacts the performance of 
remanufacturing. 
• The remanufacturing opportunity can form a lose-lose situation, making the 
players’ profits shrunk. 
• The manufacturer may be worse off with a lower remanufacturing cost or a 
larger return rate. 
• The remanufacturing may be detrimental to the environment.  
 
